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I. Introduction 
 
The consumption of alcoholic beverages has been an important part of European culture for 
centuries.
1
 Alcoholic beverages are important commodities that are widely traded across 
frontiers.
2
 Alcohol is, however, a toxic substance whose excessive consumption is one of the 
four leading risk factors for the development of non-communicable diseases (NCDs),
3
 which 
account for around 86% of deaths in the European Union.
4
  
 
The prevention of alcohol related harm and NCDs is complex, not least because multiple 
factors influence alcohol consumption and various policy tools of differing effectiveness are 
available to address them.
5
 This chapter analyses the issues that this complexity poses for 
both Member States and the EU. For Member States this comprises balancing the global 
commitments they have made to reduce alcohol related harm as members of the World 
Health Assembly, while respecting their obligations under the EU Treaties to protect the free 
circulation of goods. For the EU this comprises fulfilling their own Treaty obligations –
supporting the Member States in developing their public health policies and alleviating cross-
border health problems, while respecting the principles of conferred powers, subsidiarity and 
proportionality.  
 
We will begin by analysing the effect of EU law on the adoption of alcohol control measures 
by the Member States, first placing the adoption of these measures in their international 
public health context, then discussing the way in which the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) has assessed the compatibility of these measures with Articles 34 and 36 
TFEU on the free movement of goods. We will argue that the CJEU’s analysis has not fully 
captured the complexity of alcohol control, nor the fact that Member States must balance 
trade and public health interests in light of the international commitments they have made, 
and that this potentially threatens the multisectoral, evidence-based approach that all Member 
States have committed to. We will then analyse the direct contribution of EU law to 
preventing alcohol related harm, examining key EU legislative and policy measures. We will 
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conclude that the EU has failed to use evidence effectively to discharge its responsibilities to 
ensure a high level of public health protection in all EU policies. Ultimately, we argue that if 
the EU does not seize the opportunities that the EU Treaties offer, Member States will 
continue to face problems in negotiating the dual nature of alcoholic beverages as they seek 
to find effective solutions to an inherently complex issue.  
 
II. EU judicial scrutiny of national alcohol control measures 
 
The Court’s case law assessing the compatibility of national laws with EU free movement 
Treaty provisions (2) must be first be contextualised (1). 
 
1. The international public health context for Member State alcohol control 
 
All EU Member States are parties to the UN Political Declaration of September 2011 on the 
prevention and control of non-communicable diseases.
6
 They have all also committed to the 
WHO Global strategy to reduce the harmful use of alcohol
7
 and the WHO Global Action Plan 
on the Prevention and Control of NCDs for 2013-2020.
8
 Furthermore, within the WHO 
European Region, the Member States have committed to a European action plan to reduce the 
harmful use of alcohol.
9
  
 
All these strategic documents recognise the severity of alcohol related harm. The Political 
Declaration states plainly that NCDs are ‘one of the major challenges for development in the 
twenty-first century’.10 According to the WHO Global strategy, harmful use of alcohol alone 
accounts for 3.8% of global deaths and 4.5% of the global disease burden.
11
 The burden of 
alcohol related harm is especially pressing in Europe, which has the highest levels of alcohol 
consumption and thus the highest levels of alcohol related harm in the world.
12
 In response to 
the critical need to address alcohol related harm, WHO members have committed to 
evidence-based action on alcohol control, recognising that ‘countries that are most active in 
implementing evidence-based and cost effective alcohol policies and programmes will profit 
from substantial gains in health and well-being’.13  
 
There is international recognition however that, despite the available evidence, responses to 
alcohol related harm are currently insufficient at both global and European level. According 
to the Global strategy, ‘policy responses are often fragmented and do not always correspond 
to the magnitude of the impact on health’.14 The European action plan more explicitly 
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recognises that ‘alcohol policies still do not reflect the gravity of the health, social and 
economic harm resulting from the harmful use of alcohol’.15 In particular, the Global strategy 
emphasises that addressing the ‘multifaceted determinants of alcohol-related harm’16 requires 
‘comprehensive action across numerous sectors’.17 The European action plan similarly 
encourages ‘coherence and “joined-up” action’.18  
 
Accordingly, the Global alcohol strategy provides ‘a portfolio of policy options and 
interventions that should be considered … as integral parts of national policy’.19 These 
options are organised into ten action areas, which broadly cover leadership, research, 
treatment and prevention. The action areas relating to prevention contain suggestions for a 
range of legal interventions. The following paragraphs highlight a range of specific examples 
recommended by the European action plan, which mirrors the portfolio established by the 
Global strategy. First, ‘the implementation of even small reductions in the availability of 
alcohol can bring health gain[s]’,20 so Member States are encouraged to strengthen laws on 
alcohol outlet density and maintain government retail monopolies where they exist.
21
 They 
are furthermore encouraged to set minimum purchase ages at 18 years and develop strong 
systems for licensing the sale of alcohol. Secondly, Member States should ‘have systems in 
place to prevent inappropriate and irresponsible alcohol advertising and marketing that 
targets children and young people’,22 and are encouraged to consider the following options: 
regulating the content of advertising, regulating sponsorship by alcohol brands, regulating 
alcohol marketing in new media, and restricting or banning promotions that target children. 
The European action plan specifically notes that supranational action is needed with respect 
to commercial communications that cross borders.
23
 Member States are reminded that ‘action 
in drinking environments is also fundamentally important’,24 and that ‘labelling should be 
introduced like that used for other foodstuffs … on the content and composition of the 
product for for the protection of [consumer] health and interests’.25 Finally, ‘of all alcohol 
policy measures, the evidence is strongest for the impact of alcohol prices as an incentive to 
reduce heavy drinking occasions and regular harmful drinking’.26 States are encouraged to 
both increase alcohol taxation and consider imposing minimum prices for alcohol.  
 
States are encouraged to take primary responsibility for adopting as broad a range of the 
above measures as possible, but they are not expected to do so unaided. The European action 
plan therefore declares that ‘international frameworks should enable, rather than hinder, 
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individual countries to be bold and innovative in taking evidence-based approaches to 
reducing the harmful use of alcohol’.27 Although such bold pursuit of public health interests 
must be balanced against other competing policy interests, such as free trade, the Global 
strategy notes that free trade agreements recognise the right of countries to adopt justifiable, 
non-discriminatory public health measures. Therefore it is noted that, ‘national, regional and 
international efforts should take into account the impact of harmful use of alcohol’28 in the 
balancing process.  
 
Member States must also be mindful of the economic and political power of the global 
alcohol industry. Multinational alcohol corporations recorded profits in 2005 totalling USD 
26 billion, and the top ten alcoholic beverage manufacturers accounted for 48% of branded 
sales.
29
 For particular alcoholic beverages, the concentration of economic power is even 
greater, with 50% of the global beer market belonging to only five corporations.
30
 The largest 
multinational alcohol corporations therefore have considerable market leverage, especially in 
Europe from which 70% of the world’s alcohol is exported.31 As a result, these corporations 
are also powerful political players and attempt to influence policy making through a number 
of overt and covert tactics, including: the manipulation of evidence;
32
 the direct lobbying of 
policymakers and politicians;
33
 the promotion of personal responsibility through social 
marketing campaigns;
34
 and the co-opting of policymaking processes,
35
 often through front 
groups.
36
 Member States must therefore be aware of the tactics of the alcohol industry, and 
take steps to avoid conflicts of interest which would limit the effectiveness of their alcohol 
control policies.  
 
2. The compatibility of Member State alcohol control policies with EU internal 
market law 
 
Since the Member States have committed at WHO level to implementing a range of 
legislative alcohol control measures, and since free trade interests and public health interests 
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are often at opposite ends of the spectrum of conflicting interests involved in alcohol 
control,
37
 it is unsurprising that the CJEU’s alcohol control case law under Article 34 TFEU 
is extensive. Restricting alcohol advertising makes it ‘more difficult for new foreign products 
to break onto the market’,38 which is ‘liable to impede access to the market’39 more for 
imported products than for domestic products. Minimum unit pricing prevents ‘the lower cost 
price of imported products being reflected in the selling price to the consumer’40 which in 
itself is capable of hindering market access. Information disclosure measures that require 
physical changes in labelling or production impose dual regulatory burdens on alcoholic 
beverages, and there is ‘no valid reason why, provided that they have been lawfully produced 
and marketed in one of the Member States, alcoholic beverages should not be introduced into 
any other Member State’.41 Finally, while not all monopoly rules are caught by Article 34 – 
retail monopolies are permissible – the Court has consistently held that conditioning the 
importation of alcoholic beverages can create barriers to trade.
42
   
 
Measures caught by Article 34 can be justified under Article 36 TFEU or the mandatory 
requirement doctrine.
43
 They must pursue a legitimate objective of public interest and satisfy 
the principle of proportionality, which means that they must be appropriate for securing the 
achievement of the objective pursued and not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain 
it.
44
 Early cases explicitly acknowledged the ‘undeniable’ link between alcohol advertising 
and consumption, and the Court has recognised that preventing alcohol-related harm is 
‘indisputably one of the grounds which may justify derogation from [Article 34] of the 
Treaty’.45 Establishing a legitimate objective for alcohol control is therefore not contentious; 
establishing the proportionality of alcohol control measures that fall within the scope of 
Article 34 TFEU raises more complex questions.  
 
a. Establishing appropriateness 
To establish a measure’s appropriateness, the Court will enquire as to whether there is 
sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the means chosen will be suitable for achieving the 
objectives pursued. In earlier case law such as Franzen, the Court hardly engaged with 
evidence, insisting that it was for the Swedish government to demonstrate the proportionality 
of their licensing system, and that they had not done so in this instance.
46
 Similarly, in 
Bacardi France (dealing with free movement of services) the Court was willing to accept that 
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rules restricting direct and indirect advertising for alcoholic beverages
47
 were ‘appropriate to 
ensure their aim of protecting public health’48 without any further discussion of the 
supporting evidence. 
 
Recent case law however demonstrates a shift in the Court’s approach to evidence. In 
Akohainen, the Court still insisted that Finland had not demonstrated the proportionality of its 
licensing system,
49
 however then proceeded to refer to the judgments in Heinonen
50
 and 
Gourmet, acknowledging that those cases presented a variety of plausible arguments on the 
relative desirability of alcohol control measures. In doing so the Court showed a more 
nuanced appreciation of the way in which alcohol control policy is shaped by evidence and 
context.  
 
In Rosengren, the Court went further, weighing the ban on personal importation of alcohol 
against the fact that the alcohol monopoly could theoretically refuse to import any beverage 
that it did not stock. It concluded that ‘in the light of the alleged objective … limiting 
generally the consumption of alcohol in the interest of protecting the health and life of 
humans, that prohibition, because of the rather marginal nature of its effects in that regard, 
must be considered unsuitable for achievement of that objective’.51 Thus, in Rosengren the 
Court directly engages with the supporting evidence, albeit that this lead to a conclusion of 
inappropriateness in the circumstances.  
 
Scotch Whisky confirms that the Court is now prepared to directly engage with public health 
evidence. The Court explicitly acknowledged that a minimum unit pricing measure ‘is part of 
a more general political strategy designed to combat the devastating effects of alcohol’ and 
that the measures ‘constitutes one of 40 measures whose objective is to reduce, in a consistent 
and systematic manner, the consumption alcohol’.52 This awareness of the fact that single 
interventions may play a particular role within a more complex strategy led the Court to 
conclude that it was not unreasonable to consider that minimum unit pricing is suitable for 
reducing alcohol consumption.
53
  
 
Despite the Court’s increased willingness to engage with the evidence base, the impact of 
measures suitable for reducing alcohol related harm must still be balanced against their 
impact upon trade. Unfortunately, the Court’s increased willingness to examine the evidence 
base for measures has not translated into it attaching greater weight to that evidence in the 
balancing exercise. 
                                                     
47
 For an analysis of the services dimension of the Bacardi France and Commission v France (loi evin) cases, see: 
J Stuyck, ‘Case C-262/02, Commission v. France and Case C-429/02, Bacardi France SAS and Télévision 
française 1 SA (TF1) et al., judgments of the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of 13 July 2004’ (2005) 42 
Common Market Law Review 783. 
48
 Case C-429/02 Bacardi France [2004] ECLI:EU:C:2004:432, para 38.  
49
 C-434/04 Ahokainen [2006] ECLI:EU:C:2006:609,  para 35. 
50
 Case C-394/97 Heinonen [1999] ECLI:EU:C:1999:308.  
51
 n42, Rosengren, para 47.  
52
 n40, Scotch Whisky, para 38. 
53
 ibid, para 36.  
 b. Establishing necessity 
To establishing the necessity of alcohol control measures the Court must ask whether 
effective attainment of the public health objective makes it necessary to tolerate the 
restriction on trade generated by the measure.  
 
In early alcohol control cases, the Court’s necessity review was ‘light touch’.54 In Aragonesa, 
restrictions on advertising in public places did ‘not appear to be manifestly unreasonable as 
part of a campaign against alcoholism’.55 In Commission v France (loi Evin) the Court found 
that ‘although there are less restrictive measures … there is not currently any measure which 
is less restrictive which can exclude or conceal indirectly television advertising for alcoholic 
beverages’.56 The review of necessity was procedural, focusing on the viability of alternative 
alcohol control options. The Court asked whether the Member State was entitled, under its 
margin of discretion, to consider that restricting trade to the chosen extent was necessary to 
achieve the public health goals pursued.  
 
However, the CJEU seems to have shifted from a procedural to a substantive review. In 
Rosengren, the Court examined the merits of monopoly rules on personal importing, 
distribution and age checks in depth, and concluded that the ban went ‘manifestly beyond 
what is necessary for the objective sought,’57 and that ‘it does not appear that there is, in all 
circumstances, an irreproachable level of effectiveness’.58 Establishing irreproachable 
effectiveness of the chosen measure was not previously the objective of the necessity review. 
Member States have a margin of discretion in determining which measures are ‘likely to 
achieve concrete results’59 in pursuit of legitimate objectives, and may therefore give ‘regard 
to the particular social circumstances and to the importance attached … to [those] 
objectives’.60  Thus, the purpose of the necessity review had been to ensure that Member 
States are not acting unreasonably in determining the balance to be struck between cross-
border trade and public health interests. This flexibility is all the more essential given that 
Member States have now committed at WHO level to effective, evidence based alcohol 
control. However, the judgment in Rosengren appears to restrict this flexibility, suggesting 
that Member States must now show that their chosen measure is specifically worth the 
restriction it makes on trade, rather than showing that the measures strikes a better balance 
between public health and trade than any other.  
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The consequences of Rosengren unfolded in Scotch Whisky. The Court appeared to start from 
a presumption that alternative measures were more proportionate due to their being less 
restrictive of trade, and conducted an analysis of whether minimum unit pricing offered 
anything more towards the achievement of the legitimate objective than the alternatives.
61
 
The Court states at one point that they were examining the ‘question as to whether it is 
possible to prefer the adoption of [a minimum unit price] to fiscal measures’.62 The shift of 
focus to the substantive necessity of the measures chosen, rather than the procedural necessity 
of striking the balance in the way chosen, eventually led the Court to conclude that perceived 
additional benefits of increased taxation over minimum unit pricing ‘not only cannot 
constitute a reason to reject such a measure, but is in fact a factor to support that measure 
being preferred to the measure imposing an MPU’.63  
 
Ultimately, one might conclude that the Courts’s increased standard of necessity review in 
alcohol control cases has led to it inverting its enquiry – instead of asking whether there is a 
less trade-restrictive way to achieve a particular level of alcohol control effectiveness, it now 
appears to ask whether a measure is effective enough to warrant a particular level of trade 
restriction. This higher standard of interest balancing arguably makes it far more difficult to 
justify alcohol control measures that make greater restrictions on trade but offer greater 
public health benefits. This is because ‘as many factors may contribute to some health 
conditions, the causal link between a risk factor and the harm may be impossible to estimate 
with any degree of accuracy’.64 This higher standard potentially even erodes Member States’ 
established discretion to ‘decide what degree of protection they wish to ensure, and the 
manner in which that degree can be achieved’65 – an argument which is reinforced by the fact 
that in Scotch Whisky the issue of discretion was mentioned only in order to support the 
assertion that Member States might adopt taxation measures over minimum unit pricing.
66
 
Clearly, the Court’s increased awareness of the evidence base underlying the adoption of 
alcohol control measures is not matched by an increased awareness of why Member States 
might give greater weight to evidence of public health effectiveness in balancing trade and 
public health interests. 
 
c. Issues arising from the Court’s review of the compatibility of alcohol control 
measures with the free movement of goods 
 
We can highlight two issues from the above analysis. First, it seems that Member States must 
now conclusively prove that the bold, evidence-based measures they have committed to 
pursue at WHO level are worth the restriction on intra-Union trade that they create, even 
though the Member States have agreed at WHO level that pursuit of such measures as part of 
a multisectoral approach is imperative to reducing the burden of alcohol related harm. The 
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conflict of norms stems from the fact that a multisectoral strategy is a complex network of 
interdependent legal and non-legal measures,
67
 some of which perform very specific roles, 
meaning that their specific effects on other interests such as free trade may be balanced by 
other policies within the overall strategy.
68
 This makes it difficult to evidentially demonstrate 
that the projected public health effects of a particular alcohol control measure will be worth 
the immediately observable restriction on trade it creates.
69
 Thus, Member States face the 
problem of being committed to adopting a plethora of interlinked, evidence-based alcohol 
control measures, but unable to prove that every measure they adopt will make a contribution 
to reducing alcohol related harm commensurate to the distortion of trade it creates. The 
consequence is that pursuit of the full range of measures suggested at WHO level may 
potentially be compromised by the preclusion of certain measures at EU level.  
 
Second, in defense of the CJEU, it has little control over the ad-hoc manner in which alcohol 
control measures are challenged. Furthermore, European judges are not expert public health 
practitioners, nor do they have full knowledge of the circumstances driving alcohol policy in 
each Member State. They must therefore base their judgments on the evidence laid before 
them. For example, in Scotch Whisky, the Court concluded that increased taxation would be 
an effective alcohol control tool after analogously applying evidence presented to it on 
tobacco taxation. However it did not factor into its analysis that tobacco is a homogenous 
consumer product that is always harmful to heath, and for which price increases are always 
desirable – whereas alcoholic beverages are an extremely heterogeneous set of products, 
consumption of which is not always harmful, and for which increasing prices in a blanket 
fashion through taxation is not always appropriate.
70
 The Court is asked to review individual 
measures out of the international public health context in which they were adopted, against a 
legal standard that is designed to protect economic interests, and which frames the issues to 
be analysed in terms of a simple dichotomy between trade restriction and public health 
protection. It should not therefore be surprising that it is difficult for the Court to factor the 
WHO level commitments that the Member States have made into its analysis, and that this 
can therefore lead to outcomes that are disappointing from a public health perspective. 
 
The Member States’ internal market obligations should be approached within the context of 
the commitments that Member States have now made at WHO level to pursuing a 
multisectoral and evidence-based approach to alcohol control. However the development of 
the CJEU’s alcohol control case law has not been able to reflect the developing international 
public health context. Neither the Member States nor the CJEU can resolve this clash on their 
own – individual Member States are not in a position to determine how supranational legal 
frameworks make provision for the balancing of interests. EU regulatory intervention is 
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therefore required if the EU legal framework is going to support rather than hinder Member 
States’ pursuit of their WHO commitments. The EU has a duty to help resolve issues that are 
generated by the cross border nature of the alcohol trade. 
 
III. Regulating the cross-border trade of alcoholic beverages at EU level  
 
As public health policy within the European Union began to develop, the Member States 
agreed that the EU should be given the legal competence to act in the field of public health, to 
reflect the public health activities that had been taking place at European level for some 
time.
71
 This competence, introduced in the Maastricht Treaty, was subsequently strengthened 
when demands were made of the EU to step up its efforts to contain BSE.
72
 The latest 
revision of the EU Treaties specifically refers to the prevention of alcohol and tobacco related 
harm, whilst continuing to exclude ‘any harmonisation of the law and regulations of the 
Member States’. However, beyond this supportive competence in the field of health, the EU 
also has a mandate to adopt a high level of public health protection in the development and 
implementation of all its policies, including in its internal market policy.
73
 Thus, the EU can 
rely on Article 114 TFEU – the EU’s general power to enact harmonisation measures which 
have as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market – to adopt 
alcohol control measures with cross-border implications.  
 
The EU legal mandate to ensure a high level of public health protection in all its policies, and 
therefore tackle cross-border issues arising from the consumption of alcoholic beverages, is 
supplemented by a firm political mandate from Member States. In 2001 the European 
Council asked the European Commission to develop a ‘comprehensive Community strategy 
aimed at reducing alcohol-related harm’,74 and in particular pushed for the Commission to 
‘make full use of all Community policies’.75 These calls were reiterated in particular with the 
Council’s Conclusions on alcohol and young people in 200476 and those on alcohol and 
health in 2009.
77
 More recently, the European Parliament joined the chorus with its 
Resolution on Alcohol Strategy in 2015,
78
 which prompted yet another set of Conclusions 
from the Council.
79
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 However, it is clear that, over the years, the EU has failed to effectively mainstream the 
protection of public health in its internal market policy in light with existing evidence (1) and 
has ‘instrumentalised’ the principle of subsidiarity to minimise its intervention in this 
controversial policy area where political will has been lacking (2).  
 
1. The EU’s failure to fulfil its obligation to mainstream public health concerns into 
its internal market policy 
 
Article 168(1) TFEU requires that ‘A high level of human health protection shall be ensured 
in the definition and implementation of all Union policies and activities’. This 
‘mainstreaming’ obligation can also be found in Article 114(3) TFEU, and has been further 
reinforced following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, with new Article 9 TFEU and 
Article 35 EU Charter. The purpose of these provisions is to ensure that any policy making in 
fields that could have either a positive or a negative impact on health are arranged in such a 
way as to have a positive impact upon health. Even though the threshold of what would 
constitute ‘a high level of public health protection’ remains undefined, these provisions 
nonetheless require the EU to place health concerns at the centre of the policy process and to 
give them sufficient consideration when balancing them against other interests, not least 
economic interests.  
 
Mainstreaming is particularly important if the issue at hand is as complex as alcohol control 
and requires a multisectoral response to the problems excessive alcohol consumption raises. 
It should help ensure that a given issue is treated consistently across multiple policy fields, 
when input from multiple policy fields – and therefore Directorates-General of the 
Commission – is required. 
 
Public health mainstreaming was first seriously addressed at EU level during the Finnish 
Council Presidency in 2006, with the introduction of Health in All Policies,
80
 a strategic 
initiative that was intended to galvanise policy makers to consider health determinants 
controlled in sectors other than health. Health in All Policies was considered necessary on the 
grounds that: 
 
(a) the EU’s policies did not consider health appropriately, (b) the EU’s policy-
making system did not utilize the available structures and mechanisms in the best 
possible way, from a public health point of view, and (c) simply, because an 
implementation shortfall was seen in how health was integrated in all community 
policies.
81
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Health in All Policies therefore offered the EU an ideal opportunity to recognise that complex 
economic policies could have significant health impacts which it should in turn consider as 
part of its obligation to ensure a high level of public health protection in all its policies. 
Unfortunately, the EU did not seize this opportunity. 
 
a. The EU Alcohol Strategy and the EU Forum 
The EU’s Alcohol Strategy of 2006, which responded to the various calls for action discussed 
above, does not mention Health in All Policies, or indeed the EU’s mainstreaming 
obligations. There is very little discussion as to how the Strategy could be used as a vehicle 
through which to mainstream alcohol control concerns into other relevant policy areas: the 
Strategy is vague at best in this regard,
82
 and fails to provide any specific guidance as to how 
objectives related to the prevention of alcohol related harm could be integrated into other EU 
policymaking areas. Even though the Commission stated that the EU would add value to 
Member State actions and deal with issues that they cannot effectively handle on their own
83
 
through ‘a coordinated strategy to reduce alcohol-related harm’,84  it did not take the 
opportunity to focus on ensuring coherence between the public health and internal market 
imperatives set out in the Treaties.  
 
This is all the more disappointing as the EU Alcohol Strategy presented itself as a 
comprehensive plan to reduce alcohol related harm in Europe.
85
 The main part of the Strategy 
is in reality an exercise in mapping good practice – nothing novel is suggested, rather a brief 
selection of measures that Member States are already undertaking is presented, organised into 
five focus fields.
86
 In terms of the Strategy’s suggestions for how the EU itself can act to 
reduce alcohol related harm, the options put forward are decidedly lacklustre and do not 
address the conflict between public health and free trade interests. The prospect of EU 
harmonisation in response to cross-border concerns is specifically excluded. The proposals 
mostly advocate reliance on self-regulatory mechanisms.  
 
The EU Alcohol and Health Forum was set up in 2007 as the ‘cornerstone’87 of the EU 
Alcohol Strategy. Conceived of as a ‘Forum for action’,88 the Forum is a gathering of a broad 
range of stakeholders, ranging from industry and hospitality operators to consumer and public 
health organisations. The founding Charter of the Forum requires its members to ‘devote an 
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increasing level of effort’89 to the commitments made within the Forum to reducing alcohol 
related harm, and to demonstrate how their commitments are contributing to reducing alcohol 
related harm in a ‘transparent, participatory and accountable way’.90 However, the Forum did 
not live up to these expectations and never was the driver of action that it purported to be. 
Supposedly comprised of ‘experts from different stakeholder organisations and representative 
from Member States, other EU institutions and agencies’,91 in reality Forum membership 
comprises a disproportionately large number of industry operators,
92
 who have sought to use 
their position to shift policymaking towards weak, smokescreen interventions.
93
 Although the 
Forum was set up to cover a range of policy areas – from curbing underage drinking to 
commercial communications, education, enforcing age limits and changing consumer 
behaviour – 70% of active commitments on the Forum’s database94 relate only to education 
and responsible consumption. When one also considers that most Forum commitments are 
made by industry operators, it becomes clear that the Forum is not a vehicle for ‘concrete and 
verifiable’95 commitments, but rather the alcohol industry’s vehicle for the promotion of 
ineffective information-based interventions and personal responsibility rhetoric.
96
 Any hope 
that the Forum would be a way to ‘step up actions relevant to reducing alcohol related 
harms’97 was also misplaced. In 2012 a quarter of Forum members did not even submit a 
monitoring report on their commitments.
98
 The reports have also consistently been ineffective 
in demonstrating the effectiveness of commitments.
99
  
 
Overall, the Forum – and somewhat by extension, the Strategy, which placed considerable 
reliance upon the Forum – cannot be considered a success. It acted as a vehicle for the 
promotion of conflicts of interest rather than the promotion of action.
100
 It therefore was no 
surprise that, in 2015, all the public health NGOs resigned from the Forum on the basis that it 
had failed to deliver the meaningful and durable contribution to addressing alcohol related 
harm that had been promised, precipitating its eventual collapse.
101
 The lack of any ambition 
in the EU Alcohol Strategy to implement a Health in All Policies approach to alcohol control 
is astonishing. The fact that the Commission has recently refused to develop another EU 
Alcohol Strategy to replace the 2006 Strategy, which expired in 2013, means that it has 
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relinquished yet another opportunity to uphold its public health mainstreaming obligations 
with respect to alcohol control.  
 
Whilst the EU Alcohol Strategy entrusts Member States with the adoption of comprehensive 
multi-sectoral strategies, it also explicitly acknowledges that:  
 
Studies carried out at national and EU level show that in some cases, where there is a 
cross border element, better coordination at, and synergies established with, the EU 
level might be needed. Examples include cross-border sales promotion of alcohol that 
could attract young drinkers, or cross-border TV advertising of alcoholic beverages 
that could conflict with national restrictions. However, very few EU harmonizing 
rules have been adopted to date to combat alcohol-related harm.
102
 
 
b. The striking paucity of EU alcohol control harmonisation measures 
Ten years later, and despite growing awareness and commitments at international level, this 
is still the case.
103
 For the purpose of this chapter, we will focus on three regulatory 
instruments adopted as EU internal market measures to demonstrate the EU’s insufficient 
commitment to addressing the public health concerns resulting from the extensive cross-
border trade in alcoholic beverages.
104
  
 
The first area of EU regulatory intervention intended to reduce the harmful consumption of 
alcoholic beverages is the ban imposed on the use of nutrition and health claims on alcoholic 
beverages of more than 1.2% by volume of alcohol.
105
 Claims are often used by industry 
operators as a means to promote the characteristics of the foods they have placed on the 
market, and therefore constitute a potentially powerful tool to distinguish their goods from 
competing goods and influence consumer behaviour. More specifically, claims may 
‘encourage consumers to make choices which directly influence their total intake of 
individual nutrients or other substances in a way which would run counter to scientific 
advice’.106 It is therefore not surprising that the validity of Article 4(3), which significantly 
limits the freedom of alcohol manufacturers and distributors to promote their products using 
food claims, was challenged both during the legislative process that has led to the adoption of 
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the Food Claims Regulation (i.e. ex ante)
107
 and after its adoption in a judicial review action 
before the CJEU (i.e. ex post).  
 
The question the CJEU was requested to answer was whether, by prohibiting the description 
of a wine as ‘easily digestible’ (‘bekömmlich’), Article 4(3) violated the freedom of a German 
winegrowers’ cooperative to choose an occupation and to conduct a business, under Articles 
15 and 16 of the EU Charter.
108
 In its judgment, the Court placed a strong emphasis on 
Article 35 of the EU Charter, which requires that ‘a high level of human health protection be 
ensured in the definition and implementation of all the European Union’s policies and 
activities’, to dismiss the claim and uphold the validity of Article 4(3). After referring to the 
EU’s mainstreaming obligation laid down in Article 9 TFEU,109 the Court pointed out that ‘in 
view of the risks of addiction and abuse as well as the complex harmful effects known to be 
linked to the consumption of alcohol, in particular the development of serious diseases, 
alcoholic beverages represent a special category of foods that is subject to particularly strict 
regulation’.110 Thus, even if the claim is ‘substantively inherently correct in that it indicates 
reduced acidity levels’, it nonetheless remains ‘incomplete’ in that it is ‘silent as to the fact 
that, regardless of a sound digestion, the dangers inherent in the consumption of alcoholic 
beverages are not in any way removed, or even limited’.111 Consequently, the EU legislature 
was ‘fully entitled’ to take the view that such claims on alcoholic beverages are misleading 
and that they and that ‘the prohibition of such claims is warranted in the light of the 
requirement to ensure a high level of health protection for consumers’.112 This case provides 
a rare example of the EU’s attempt to effectively mainstream public health concerns in its 
internal market policy in that it recognises that exposure to alcohol marketing, through health 
and nutrition claims or otherwise, does ‘increase the risks for consumers’ health inherent in 
the immoderate consumption of any alcoholic beverage’.113 Subsequent case law 
unequivocally confirms that the CJEU will grant a broad margin of discretion to the EU when 
determining the extent to which public health concerns should justify a restriction to purely 
economic interests.
114
 
 
The second instrument of relevance which the EU has adopted on the basis of its internal 
market harmonisation powers stands in stark contrast with the Food Claims Regulation in that 
it exempts alcoholic beverages from some of the mandatory disclosure requirements it 
imposes for other foods. Regulation 1169/2011 on the food information provided to 
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consumers requires the disclosure of information intended to help consumers make 
‘informed’ food choices, referring specifically to the list of ingredients and the nutrition 
declaration.
115
 As such, it is very much in line with the information paradigm characterising 
EU consumer and health policy.
116
 However, if Article 9(1)(k) does require, as its 
predecessor did,
117
 that alcoholic beverages containing more than 1.2 % by volume of alcohol 
should indicate their actual alcoholic strength by volume,
118
 Article 16(3) exempts them from 
the disclosure requirement that consumers should be informed of the list of ingredients. The 
Commission should have produced a report by 30 December 2014 on whether alcoholic 
beverages should in future provide information on their energy value, and the reasons 
justifying possible exemptions. It was also asked to consider the need for a definition of 
‘alcopops’, which specifically target young people.119 Leaving aside the fact that the 
Commission has not complied with this mandate, it would arguably have been far more 
preferable to presume that alcoholic beverages, whose harmful consumption poses a real 
public health threat, should have been covered in the first instance. Calling on industry 
operators to provide voluntary information,
120
 will not lead to the level playing field required 
to promote a high level of public health protection, whilst it may in the longer term limit the 
freedom of Member States to do so at national level.  
  
The third internal market measure of relevance is the Audiovisual Media Services Directive 
(AVMSD) which, among others, sets down minimum standards on audiovisual commercial 
communications, including advertising, teleshopping, sponsorship and product placement.
121
 
In particular, Article 9(1)(e) requires that ‘audiovisual commercial communications for 
alcoholic beverages shall not be aimed specifically at minors and shall not encourage 
immoderate consumption of such beverages’.122 This provision is a missed opportunity, not 
least because it does not sufficiently protect children from exposure to alcohol marketing, 
insofar as most of the television programmes which children watch are not ‘aimed 
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specifically’ at them and do not therefore have to be free from such marketing.123 If the 
Commission has somewhat recognised this concern, it proposes to address it by adding a new 
Article 9(3) in the AVMSD which would read as follows: 
 
Member States and the Commission shall encourage the development of self- and co-
regulatory codes of conduct regarding inappropriate audiovisual commercial 
communications for alcoholic beverages. Those codes should be used to effectively 
limit the exposure of minors to audiovisual commercial communications for alcoholic 
beverages.
124
 
 
Once again, the Commission merely reasserts its dogmatic belief in the virtues of self-
regulation. To make matters worse, it simultaneously proposes to further liberalise a range of 
provisions, which could increase the exposure of children to alcohol marketing. Two points 
are worth noting here. Firstly, Article 23(1) would be amended to contain a daily limit on 
television advertising to replace the existing hourly limit: ‘The daily proportion of television 
advertising spots and teleshopping spots within the period between 7:00 and 23:00 shall not 
exceed 20%’. This means that a broadcaster would have more flexibility to decide when to 
insert advertising and teleshopping spots in television programme within the limits set by the 
Directive. One could venture the hypothesis that this would lead to more marketing in 
programmes with high audience thresholds, and less in programmes with low audience 
thresholds – with an overall increase in exposure to marketing and alcohol marketing more 
specifically.
125
 Secondly, product placement would be liberalised under Article 11. In the 
current version of the AVMSD, Member States have an option to ban product placement or 
not.
126
 One positive change is that the ban on product placement would remain in ‘children’s 
programmes’ (as is currently the case) and would be extended to ‘programmes with a 
significant children’s audience’. This takes into account the fact that children can be – and 
often are – exposed to marketing even in programmes that are not classified as children’s 
programmes. Unfortunately, however, the notion of ‘significant’ seems to lay down a high 
threshold which will in turn allow industry operators to continue to promote their alcohol 
beverages when children are watching. This is particularly insidious in light of the report 
published alongside the proposed revision of the AVMSD that children are affected by 
embedded marketing even though they do not always recognise it and that they openly 
declare not to like it.
127
 The fact that the AVMSD is a minimum harmonisation directive only 
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partially alleviates these concerns, as Member States who will want to seize the opportunity 
to implement stricter provisions than those contained in the AVMSD may be challenged on 
the ground that these measures are not compatible with the general free movement provision 
on the free movement of goods. Furthermore, the freedom which Member States have to 
regulate audiovisual commercial communications more strictly is limited by the country of 
origin principle.
128
 Overall, therefore, the Commission has not sufficiently taken on board all 
the evidence which has accumulated over the years on the exposure of children to alcohol 
marketing.  
 
In light of existing evidence supporting strong alcohol policies, in light of the EU’s public 
health mainstreaming obligations and in light of the Court’s case law on the compatibility of 
national alcohol control measures with general free movement provisions, it is indeed 
extremely difficult to comprehend why the EU has not done more in areas with a clear cross-
border effect, if this is not for its chronic lack of political will. 
 
2. The principle of subsidiarity as a cloak for the EU’s chronic lack of political will 
to adopt an evidence-based EU alcohol policy 
 
The principle of subsidiarity has traditionally been invoked to guard against excessive EU 
regulatory intervention. In this instance, however, the EU has relied on this principle to 
significantly limit its regulatory intervention. The way the European Commission has 
interpreted the principle of subsidiarity in its EU Alcohol Strategy is to avoid using the 
Union’s competences at all, insisting that ‘there is no intention to substitute Community 
action to national policies … in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity … In particular 
the Commission does not intend as a consequence of this Communication to propose the 
development of harmonised legislation in the field of the prevention alcohol-related harm’.129 
We argue that this position is misconceived in that it ignores the fragmentation resulting from 
the Court’s case law and the impact such fragmentation has had on Member States’ freedom 
to adopt alcohol control policies.  
 
The principle of subsidiarity constrains EU action by requiring that: 
 
in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if 
and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved 
by the Member States, either at central or at regional and local level, but can rather, 
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by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, but better achieved at Union 
level.
130
 
 
Despite ‘its lack of conceptual contours’,131 the principle of subsidiarity was never intended 
to be relied upon as a way out of the EU’s obligation to ensure that a high level of public 
health protection should be ensured in the development and implementation of all its policies, 
and more specifically its internal market policy. If it admittedly lays down a presumption in 
favour of decentralisation,
132
 it does not lay down an irrefutable presumption. In fact, 
paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Protocol on Subsidiarity and Proportionality require that the EU 
should legislate only to the extent necessary and that EU measures should leave as much 
scope for national decisions as possible, whilst securing the aim of the measure and observing 
the requirements of the Treaty.
133
 In other words, a rigorous subsidiarity analysis may not 
necessarily result in EU action being barred. The principle of subsidiarity may rather lead to 
an extension of the activities of the Union within the framework of its powers when 
circumstances so require’.134 
 
As Lyon-Caen noted shortly after the principle of subsidiarity was first introduced in the EU 
Treaty, ‘subsidiarity can cut both ways’.135 Furthermore, Article 3 of the Protocol also 
emphasises that: 
 
Subsidiarity is a dynamic concept and should be applied in the light of the objectives 
set out in the Treaty. It allows Community action within the limits of its powers to be 
expanded where circumstances so require, and conversely, to be restricted or 
discontinued where it is no longer justified. 
 
The Court’s growing case law on the compatibility of national measures with EU free 
movement provisions strongly suggests that EU legislation is necessary if the EU is to 
achieve the dual objective of establishing and ensuring the functioning of the internal market, 
whilst ensuring a high level of public health protection. Internal market objectives are better 
served if cross-border issues affecting all Member States are regulated by the EU at EU-level. 
This is the case even if Member States have suffered from the lack of harmonised rules to 
varying degrees, depending in particular on the extent to which they have attempted to 
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develop comprehensive, multisectoral and evidence-based alcohol control policies. Writing in 
relation to tobacco products, the Court recently stated: 
 
Even if the second of those objectives might be better achieved at the level of the 
Member States, the fact remains that pursuing it at that level would be liable to 
entrench, if not create, situations in which some Member States permit the placing on 
the market of tobacco products containing certain characterising flavours, whilst 
others prohibit it, thus running completely counter to the first objective of Directive 
2014/40, namely the improvement of the functioning of the internal market for 
tobacco and related products. 
 
The interdependence of the two objectives pursued by the directive means that the EU 
legislature could legitimately take the view that it had to establish a set of rules for the 
placing on the EU market of tobacco products with characterising flavours and that, 
because of that interdependence, those two objectives could best be achieved at EU 
level.
136
  
 
It is immensely concerning that the Commission purports to respect the principle of 
subsidiarity – a legal principle subject to judicial review – to hide its utter lack of political 
will to adopt evidence-based standards with a view to addressing inherently cross-border 
issues that the free movement of goods and services has increased rather than alleviated and 
that the Court’s case law has put in sharp focus. Why would the fact that drinking patterns 
vary from one Member State to another, in itself, lead to the conclusion that regulating the 
labelling and the marketing of alcoholic beverages is more effectively done at national rather 
than at EU level? The fragmentation of the internal market will only be increased if Member 
States are left to regulate the labelling and marketing of alcoholic beverages at national level. 
As discussed above, such measures are classified for the purposes of Article 34 TFEU as 
either product requirements or certain selling arrangements that may not apply equally in law 
and in fact, leaving it to the CJEU to determine whether these measures are proportionate. As 
the Council Conclusions of December 2015 specifically emphasise, ‘an EU strategy can 
further support and complement national public health policies’,137 calling specifically on the 
Commission to ‘focus on initiatives on the reduction of alcohol-related harm with a cross-
border dimension and an EU added value as a follow-up to the first EU Alcohol Strategy’.138  
 
By failing to apply the internal market logic to alcoholic beverages as it has in relation to 
tobacco products, the EU has instrumentalised the principle of subsidiarity to reach pre-
determined outcomes.
139
 This can only lead to increased regulatory fragmentation within the 
EU, thus depriving Member States from the certainty they should be able to hope for as to the 
compatibility of their alcohol control measures with EU free movement rules, thus making it 
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more difficult for them to uphold the international commitments they have made to reduce 
the burden of NCDs, and in particular the harmful consumption of alcoholic beverages. 
 
Conclusion: the EU’s failure to engage with evidence 
The necessity of engaging with evidence when making policy on public health issues such as 
alcohol control is emphasised throughout the literature.
140
 Alcohol control will not be fully 
effective if the evidence on, amongst other things, how consumers behave in purchasing 
situations
141
 and the socio-economic environment in which alcohol consumption takes 
place,
142
 are not taken into account when developing and implementing policy. The 
desirability of factoring the latest evidence into public health policymaking is also reflected 
in Article 114(3), where internal market legislative proposals relating to health must ‘take as 
a base a high level of protection, taking account in particular of any new development based 
on scientific facts’.    
 
It is therefore all the more regrettable that the Commission has largely failed to engage with 
this large evidence base which suggests that measures affecting the price,
143
 availability and 
accessibility
144
 of alcoholic beverages, as well as their advertising,
145
 will have the most 
impact in decreasing rates of excessive consumption. It is striking that the EU Alcohol 
Strategy prioritised the types of policy measures that have been found to have the least 
impact, namely information and education,
146
 or harm reduction policies (which do not aim to 
reduce consumption of alcohol but its associated harms).
147
  
 
A comprehensive statement of the evidence base, funded by the Commission, was produced 
specifically to support the EU Alcohol Strategy.
148
 However, as one of the authors noted in 
evidence given to the European Union Committee of the House of Lords on the EU Alcohol 
Strategy, ‘a lot of that evidence did not get through into the strategy itself’.149 This is all the 
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more curious in light of the fact that during the drafting process for the Strategy there were 
multiple references to evidence-based policy making and many evidentially effective 
interventions were on the table.
150
 The fact that the final consensus on the main themes and 
content of the Strategy,
151
 as well as the final text, bore little relation to earlier work on the 
Strategy strongly suggests that a significant ‘watering down’ influence was exerted on the 
Commission’s work, highlighting its failure to engage properly with evidence – or perhaps its 
failure to resist those who lobby against an evidence-based approach.  
 
Most of the evidence on self-regulation and partnership with the alcohol industry points to its 
inefficacy, due to the inherent conflicts of interest, and merely supports the use of self-
regulatory mechanisms if it is part of a wider legislative approach to alcohol control.
152
 The 
Commission however has relied almost exclusively on the self-regulation and Forum 
commitments to drive the work of the EU Strategy, being so blind as to praise its work in 
assessments of the progress of the Strategy,
153
 and ignore the conflicts of interest such 
governance mechanisms unavoidably promote.
154
  
 
Nobody would dispute the complexity of designing an effective EU alcohol policy. What is 
more controversial is that the EU has hardly engaged with this complexity, despite its strong 
mandate to do so, and the plethora of evidence at its disposal. This will unavoidably make it 
much more difficult for Member States to uphold their commitment to reducing the burden of 
NCDs by 2025.
155
 Nothing will ever replace the political motivation and courage which are 
currently lacking. The suggestion that the Commission should adopt evidence-based policies, 
which limit the purely economic private interests of alcoholic beverage operators, in order to 
comply with its Treaty obligations to ensure a high level of public health protection for all, is 
unlikely to meet with any sympathy in Brussels. 
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